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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the court of appeals correct in concluding that 
roadblock stops violate Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in that 
there is no legislative authorization for such stops? 
2. Does Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution permit 
law enforcement officers to make any seizure without an individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing? 
3. Did the court of appeals correctly determine that 
respondent's consent to the search of his vehicle was the fruit of the illegal 
roadblock stop? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals issued its opinion in State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 
141 (Ut. App. 1991). 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1990 Supp.) provides this 
court with jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of certiorari. 
Judgment was entered by the court of appeals on March 15, 1991. On 
April 14, 1991, petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file its 
petition for writ of certiorari. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUES 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
The right of people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-M7(b) through (d) (1953 as amended): 
The commission, and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall designate, 
peace officers, state patrolmen, and others duly 
authorized by the department or by law shall have 
power and it shall be their duty: . . . 
(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant for any violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions of this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles or the 
use of the highways. 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief 
that any vehicle is being operated in violation of 
any provision of this act or of any other law 
regulating the operation of vehicles to require the 
driver thereof to stop, exhibit his drivers license 
and the registration card issued for the vehicles and 
submit to an inspection of such vehicle, the 
registration plates and registration card thereon. 
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(d) To inspect any vehicle of a type 
required to be registered hereunder in any public 
garage or repair shop or in any place where such 
vehicles are held for sale or wrecking, for the 
purpose of locating stolen vehicles and investigating 
the title and registration thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-3-914 (1953 as amended): 
(1) Within the boundaries of the 
municipality, police officers have the same 
authority as deputy sheriffs, including at all times 
the authority to preserve the public peace, prevent 
crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, 
protect persons and property, remove nuisances 
existing in the public streets, roads, and highways, 
enforce every law relating to the suppression of 
offenses, and perform all duties required of them 
by ordinance or resolution. 
(2) This section is not a limitation of a 
police officer's statewide authority as otherwise 
provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-22-2(l)(a) and (b) (1953 as amended): 
(1) The sheriff shall: 
(a) preserve the peace; 
(b) make all lawful arrests. 
Utah Code Ann. §27-10-4(i)(a) and (b) (1953 as amended): 
(1) The Utah Highway Patrol shall: 
(a) enforce the state laws and rules 
governing use of the state highways; 
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(b) regulate traffic on all highways 
and roads of the state; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-20.5(1) (1953 as amended): 
(1) The department shall require that 
a certificate of inspection, as required by Section 
41-6-158, or proof of exemption from inspection, 
be presented at the time of, and as a condition of, 
registration or renewal of registration of a motor 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-158(1) and (2) (1953 as amended): 
(1) At least once each year the department 
shall require that every motor vehicle registered in 
this state or bearing temporary permits or Utah 
plates, except off-highway vehicles, be inspected 
and that an official certificate of inspection and 
approval be obtained for each vehicle. 
(2) The inspection shall be made and 
certificate obtained with respect to the mechanism, 
brakes, and equipment of every vehicle designated 
by the department under this section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondent was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-8(l)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). (R.7) The charge was based on the 
discovery of approximately one kilogram of cocaine in his vehicle. (T.52) 
That discovery was made at a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Juab County. 
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The roadblock was conducted by the Utah Highway Patrol under the 
direction of Sargent Paul Mangleson. (T.46-48) At the time that 
respondent was stopped at the roadblock the troopers had no reason to 
believe that he was violating the law. (T.31-32) Respondent's motion to 
suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle as a result of that stop was 
denied by the district court. (R.104-113) 
Respondent appealed the district court's decision to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed respondent's conviction. 
State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Ut. App. 1991). That court held that the 
roadblock stop failed to meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
The court of appeals also held that the roadblock violated Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution in that the officers lacked statutory authority 
to conduct a roadblock. The court of appeals did not address respondent's 
contention that Article I, Section 14 required individualized suspicion to 
conduct a stop. Finally, the court of appeals held that the respondent's 
consent to the search of his vehicle was the fruit of the initial illegal stop. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH PROHIBITS ROADBLOCKS. 
The first issue that the state is requesting this court to review is 
the constitutionality of roadblock stops under Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. The basis for the holding in the court of appeals was 
that law enforcement officers need express statutory authority to conduct 
a roadblock. The State contends that this is a novel approach meriting 
review by this court. The State further contends that the issue was 
decided erroneously by the court of appeals. That court also failed to 
address respondent's contention that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution requires individualized suspicion before a stop may be made. 
If this court grants petitioner's writ of certiorari to review the 
constitutionality of roadblocks, it should also consider whether Article I, 
Section 14 requires individualized suspicion before a seizure may be made. 
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A. 
The Court of Appeals Correctly Determined that 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
Requires Express Legislative Authority for a 
Roadblock. 
Petitioner contends that the roadblock issue is an important 
question that should be addressed by this court. This is somewhat 
inconsistent with the position taken by the petitioner in the court of 
appeals. There, petitioner refused to address the roadblock issue either in 
its brief or oral argument. More importantly, the issue of the necessity for 
legislative authority for executive action is not a novel issue in other 
courts. Even under a less restrictive fourth amendment analysis, courts 
have required that law enforcement officers have statutory authority to 
conduct a search or seizure that may invade an individual's fundamental 
rights. State v. Marchand. 104 Wash.2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (Wash. 1985); 
Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States. 397 U. S. 72 (1970). 
Recent decisions from other courts addressing their respective state 
constitutional provisions have reached the conclusion that the executive 
authority to conduct a roadblock cannot be implied. Nelson v. Lane County. 
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304 Or. 97, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987); State v. Henderson. 114 Ida. 293, 756 
P.2d 1057 (Ida. 1988); State v. Smith. 674 P.2d 562 (Ok.Crim. 1984). This 
holding is based on the fact that such a stop involves a substantial invasion 
of privacy interests. 
The only case cited by Respondent to stand for the proposition 
that there is implied authority to conduct a roadblock is People v. Estrada. 
68 111. App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d 128 £ert, d^n. 444 U. S. 968 (1979). That 
case allowed state police to conduct spot checks of motor vehicles for the 
purpose of conducting safety inspections. The court held that the need to 
inspect the safety equipment on motor vehicles justified the intrusion. The 
Utah Motor Vehicle Code makes such reasoning inapplicable to safety 
inspections of vehicles in Utah. Utah Code Ann. §41-1-20-5 (1953 as 
amended), requires proof of a safety inspection upon the annual renewal 
of a vehicle's registration. The scope and nature of the safety inspection 
are described in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-158 (1953 as amended). 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann.§41-l-17(d) (1953 as amended), limits the 
authority of officers to inspect vehicle titles and registrations to those 
vehicles located in a public garage, repair shop or place where the vehicle 
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is held for sale. Consequently, the Utah statutes preclude the type of 
safety inspections that the Illinois court authorized in Estrada. 
Petitioner also contends that the reasoning of the court of 
appeals is erroneous. Petitioner cites a single sentence from the opinion by 
the court of appeals as the determinative reason for the court's holding. In 
that sentence the court indicated that the Legislative process is " . . . 
analogous to that performed by a magistrate in the issuance of a warrant, 
[emphasis added] State v. Sims. 156 U.A.R. 8 at 12 (Ut. App. 1991). The 
criticisms of this statement made by the petitioner are premised on the 
assumption that the court of appeals held that the legislative process 
involves the same decision as a magistrate makes in issuing a warrant. 
That clearly is not what the court of appeals held. 
The basis of the court of appeals' holding on the issue of 
legislative authorization was that the policy decision to allow officers of the 
executive branch of the government to invade the privacy of citizens 
should be made by the legislative branch. In that way, "the collective will 
of the people is expressed and, furthermore, the people have notice of duly 
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authorized police activity" 156 U.A.R. at 12. This is not a novel concept as 
petitioner contends. It is merely a restatement of the separation of powers 
doctrine on which our form of government is premised. 
In a footnote, petitioner contends that a reading of several 
statutes gives peace officers implied authority to conduct a roadblock. A 
close reading of those statutes results in the conclusion that officers must 
either observe a violation of the law or have a reasonable belief that a 
vehicle is being operated in violation of the law before they may lawfully 
make a stop. Utah Code Ann. §41-l-17(b) and (c) (1953 as amended). The 
other statutes cited by petitioner give law enforcement officers authority 
to enforce the law and make lawful arrests. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§10-3-914, 17-22-2 and 27-10-4 (1953 as amended). None of these 
statutes imply any authority to make a suspicion less stop. 
The court of appeals correctly held that express legislative 
authorization is necessary to allow law enforcement officers to conduct 
roadblocks. It is not a novel concept. It is a concept based in the 
separation of powers doctrine of our form of government. Other statutes 
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in the state code do not give implied authority to conduct a roadblock. 
Those statutes all require individualized suspicion. This court should not 
grant petitioner's writ of certiorari on the issue of the need for express 
legislative authorization. 
B. 
This Court Should Address the Need for 
Individualized Suspicion Before a Stop May be 
Properly Made Under Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution 
If this court grants certiorari to review the limited decision of 
the court of appeals on roadblocks, it should also review in general the 
constitutionality of roadblocks under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. That would allow this court to review an issue that the court 
of appeals failed to address that was raised under Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. That issue is whether Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution allows any seizure without a showing of individualized 
suspicion. Several courts have held that their respective state 
constitutions require such a showing. Commonwealth v. Tarbert. 502 A.2d 
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221 (Pa. Super. 1985); State v. Henderson, supra: State v. Boyanousky. 304 
Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (Or. 1987); State v. Parms. 532 So.2d 1293 (La. 
1988). This position is also consistent with the holding of the plurality 
opinion of this court in State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 480 (Utah 1990). 
In reaching this conclusion, these courts noted that roadblock 
stops have been upheld because careful controls and limits on officers1 
discretion at a roadblock prevents a fourth amendment violation. The 
courts reason for requiring individualized suspicion is that a roadblock 
does invade a citizen's expectation of privacy. Any limits on officers' 
discretion cannot justify such a seizure in the absence of a showing of 
individualized suspicion that a crime has been committed. 
The court of appeals correctly decided the issue of the need for 
legislative authority for a roadblock. This court need not grant certiorari 
to determine that issue. However, if this court feels that it would be 
appropriate to consider the roadblock issue, it should also address the 
question of whether Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution requires 
individualized suspicion to make a seizure. 
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POINT n 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE CORRECT 
TEST TO DETERMINE IF RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO 
THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE WAS THE FRUIT OF 
THE UNLAWFUL STOP. 
Petitioner claims that the court of appeals misapplied the test 
from State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) to determine if a 
voluntary consent was the fruit of an unlawful stop. Petitioner argues that 
the court of appeals failed to give proper emphasis to the effect of the 
police misconduct on the voluntariness of the consent. In Arrovo. this 
court rejected the position that a finding of a voluntary consent overrides 
any harm from a prior illegal stop. Arroyo required a two part analysis: 
first there must be a determination that there was a voluntary consent, it 
may next be determined if that voluntary consent was the fruit of the 
illegal stop. In addressing the fruits issue this court noted that three 
factors should be addressed. Those factors include: the temporal 
proximity of the primary illegality and the granting of the consent, the 
presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and 
flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. 
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The court of appeals in this case addressed each of those issues 
separately. The court found that there was insufficient time between the 
stop and the grant of consent to attenuate the relationship between the 
two. With respect to intervening circumstances the court also found that 
"... Sims' consent, then, arose from an unbroken chain of events that began 
with the illegal roadblock" 156 U.A.R. at 14. Finally, the court of appeals 
found that however noble the intentions of the law enforcement officers 
were, and even though the officers did not behave in an abusive manner, 
the consent did not correct the constitutional violation. 
Petitioner urges that this court adopt an analysis from Florida v. 
Rover , 460 U. S. 491 (1983). The issue addressed in Rover was the 
voluntariness of the consent. The Court in Rover held that the coercive 
nature of the detention made any consent involuntary. This is a different 
issue as was addressed in both Arroyo and by the court of appeals in this 
case. In Arroyo the initial question to be decided is whether the consent 
was voluntary. If the consent is found to be voluntary, then the three 
issues previously discussed must be addressed to determine if that 
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voluntary consent was the fruit of the prior illegal stop. The R o v e r 
analysis urged by petitioner would do away with any analysis of the fruits 
issue. Ultimately, a voluntary consent could ameliorate any previous 
illegal stop. This is a position that this court expressly rejected in Arroyo. 
Certiorari should be denied on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari in this 
case. The court of appeals correctly held that Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of Utah prohibits roadblocks. However, if certiorari is granted 
this court should also address the question of whether Article I, Section 14 
requires individualized suspicion. Furthermore, the court of appeals 
correctly analyzed this issue of the fruits of an unlawful stop as required 
by State v. Arroyo, supra. Certiorari should not be granted on that issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1991. 
G.FREDMETOS 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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